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1 Introduction
In this note, we investigate the interaction between the leader and the follower in developing
new technologies in the presence of litigation against patent infringement and cross licensing
as its alternative. After the leader has acquired a patent and manufactures a product based
on it, the follower can carry out the follow-on research to manufacture an advanced product,
which can partially substitute the leader's product. Upon the losses of revenue, the leader can
accuse the follower of infringement to recover monopoly prot. The perpetrator of the alleged
infringement, however, is not always found guilty. When making a judgment, the court takes
into account how much the advanced technology overlaps with the existing one and how much
improvement has been made by the follow-on research, and occasionally the court considers the
patent to be invalid, which reveals the nature of \probabilistic patents."2 For these reasons, the
leader can opt for cross licensing over the costly lawsuit. Provided that both parties agree on it,
cross licensing allows them to utilize each other's works without fear of infringement. That is,
the leader can take advantage of the follower's advanced technology, of which novelty has been
made based on his preceding works. The choice between a lawsuit and cross licensing is made by
the rms, taking into account the nature of\cumulative innovation"' and (probabilistic patents
This is examined in the framework of real options based on Huisman and Kort (2015), in which
not only the timing of each investment but also its capacity is endogenously determined. This
enables us to incorporate how much the follower will imitate the precursor's work and how much
resources will be devoted to yield the improvement.
The present model helps us comprehend the patent war between competitors we can observe
in the real world, in which most innovation is sequential and cumulative. First of all, the model
shows that the competition in the burgeoning market usually entails a costly lawsuit to resolve
the conict, while the competitors easily agree on cross licensing to take advantage of each
other's works in the slow-growing market. This is a natural result because when the market is
very lucrative, the leader desires to monopolize the market in spite of the legal expenses and the
risk of losing the patent's validity in the court. If it does not seem protable enough, however,
the leader instead chooses to reconcile with the follower via cross licensing, raising extra revenue
from the advanced technology developed by the follower because the exercise of exclusive rights
paying the costs becomes less attractive. The fact that a more lucrative market is more likely
to entail a legal dispute is consistent with the argument from Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) and
1This manuscript is the abbreviated version of Jeon (2015).
2A great number of studies have acknowledged probabilistic validity of patents (e.g., Allison and Lemley (1998),
Aoki and Hu (1999), Lemley and Shapiro (2005), Llobet (2003), Farrell and Shapiro (2008), Choi (2010)).
数理解析研究所講究録
第 1983巻 2016年 41-57 41
Lemley and Shapiro (2005), and this nding is supported by empirical studies such as Lanjouw
and Schankerman (2001) and Somaya (2003).
Not only the way they resolve the dispute but also the timing of the initial innovation and
the follow-on research has signicant implications, especially in terms of dierentiated goods.
When the market demand is rapidly growing and the follower's challenge is expected shortly
after the initial innovation, the leader delays his investment until the market grows enough to
compensate the losses of revenue from the competition so that the follow-on research is triggered
at the same time, and he les alawsuit over infringement after it becomes a more severe problem.
This implies that there is a distinct dierence between the products of the leader and the follower
in the fast-growing market unless the follower is found guilty at the court later and driven out
of the market. If the demand is expected to grow slowly and the competitors reconcile via
cross licensing, the leader delays the initial innovation substantially so that both the follow-
on research and the agreement of cross licensing are triggered at the same time. This implies
that both parties takes advantage of each other's works from the very beginning, leaving little
dierence between their products in the market.
The present model also eectively integrates the authorities' patent policy by allowing the
probability that the patent is found to be valid to depend on the extent to which the patent
scope is applied. The result shows that when the court interprets a patent in a narrow sense,
the leader and the follower tend to resolve the conict via cross licensing. This is a natural
result because the leader is less likely to win the case over infringement, and thus opts for cross
licensing to raise extra revenue, even with a small market share. This relationship between the
credibility of threat of a lawsuit and the way the rms resolve the dispute is in line with Aoki
and Hu (1999). Being relieved of the fear of infringement, the follower focuses on making a
prot at a lower cost by imitating the existing technology, rather than enhancing the level of
technology. As the patent scope becomes wider, the leader holds a more dominant position in
the negotiation of cross licensing, and thus takes a larger share in the market of the advanced
technology developed by the follower. If it becomes wider enough, the leader chooses to accuse
the follower encouraged by the judge's hard line against infringement, and the follower devotes
most of his resources to develop his own technology not to be found guilty by the court.
Furthermore, the model claries that the policy on patent scope cannot induce the rst-best
result in terms of the speed of innovation. If the patent scope is interpreted in a narrow sense
and the rms decide to resolve the conict via cross licensing, the introduction of the second-
generation technology is so delayed that the agreement of cross licensing is triggered at the same
time. This is because the follower is concerned about the expected losses of his revenue from the
competition with the leader regarding the novel technology and chooses to wait until the market
grows enough to compensate for such losses. If the breadth of patent is wide enough to induce
the leader to le a lawsuit over infringement, now it is the initial innovation that is deferred
signicantly, and the follow-on research is triggered simultaneously. This result comes from the
leader's concern about losing monopoly prots by the follower's challenge. Given these results,
we can argue that neither policy can induce the rst-best outcome in which both technologies are
introduced without substantial delay. This argument is in line with Scotchmer (1991) and Green
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and Scotchmer (1995), which have shown that it is impossible for both the initial innovator and
the follow-on innovator to have adequate incentives under a patent system.
Still, we can evaluate the eectiveness of patent policy by carrying out welfare analysis in
a more comprehensive way. The total expected surplus of the consumer and that of producer,
and thus social welfare, depend not only on the timing of innovations but also on the prices
and the quantities of the products in the market, the way the competitors resolve the dispute,
and the probability that the patent is found to be valid by the court provided that it ends
up with a lawsuit. The welfare analysis taking these aspects into account reveals that social
welfare is higher when the conict is resolved via cross licensing because it does not involve
legal expenses and consumers can enjoy more products with the advanced technology at a lower
price. This result accords with Shapiro (2001), who noted that any cross license is superior
to a world in which the patentee fails to cooperate, and Denicol\`o (2002), who argued that
collusion between patentees via cross licensing can be socially benecial even if the patents are
competing. Given these arguments, one might conclude that the narrower the patent scope is,
the more social welfare we can yield. Yet, this is only half the story. Even though the dispute
is resolved out of court, the authorities' stance on infringement still comes into play because
the leader's bargaining power in the negotation of cross licensing depends on it. Namely, if the
patent scope is interpreted in a very narrow sense, the leader has little bargaining power in cross
licensing and cannot take advantage of the second-generation technology as much as he wants.
Thus, there will be fewer products with the advanced technology even at a higher price, which
leads to the decrease of social welfare.
2 The model and solutions
2.1 Setup
Suppose that there are two risk-neutral rms in the market, the leader and the follower.3 The
leader has an option to develop technology which can be patented and to manufacture a product
based on it. The demand shock is given by a one-dimensional geometric Brownian motion as
follows:
$dX(t)=\mu X(t)dt+\sigma X(t)dW(t)$ (2.1)
where $\mu$ and $\sigma$ are constant coecients and $(W(t))_{t\geq 0}$ is a standard Brownian motion on a
ltered probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{F} :=(\mathcal{F}_{t})_{t\geq 0}, \mathbb{P})$ . A risk-free rate is assumed to be a constant
$r>\mu$ for the sake of niteness of value function. Given the demand shock, the price of the
product with the rst-generation technology at time $t$ is determined as follows:
$P_{1}(t)=X(t)(1-\eta_{1}Q_{1}(t))$ (2.2)
where $Q_{1}(t)$ and a constant $\eta_{1}>0$ denote total market output of the product with the rst-
generation technology at time $t$ and its price elasticity, respectively. If the demand shock exceeds
3For simplicity, we assume that their roles are predetermined. The role can be endogenized to investigate
preemption incentive. See Chapter 9 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for detailed illustration regarding this issue.
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a threshold, the leader invests in R&D and manufactures a product with capacity $Q_{1}^{L}$ , which
incurs investment costs of $c_{1}Q_{1}^{L}$ including the R&D costs, and he makes a prot at the rate
of $P_{1}(t)Q_{1}^{L}$ . Note that the investment in R&D and the capacity is integrated in one stage for
simplicity and that the patent is assumed to be acquired immediately with no expiry date.
The basic technology developed by the leader lays the foundation for the follow-on research.
Namely, the follower has an option to develop advanced technology building on the existing
one and to manufacture a product with it. Further improvement is expected to be made, but
it can partially overlap the predecessor's works. For instance, after a leading rm in the IT
industry has invented a smartphone, a rival rm can manufacture a smartphone with ngerprint
identication or a curved display. The latter is embedded with newer technologies and can
replace the former to a certain extent. The degree of overlapping and the improvement can be
represented by the scale of the follower's investment in R&D and the capacities regarding the
rst second-generation technologies, denoted by $Q_{1}^{F}$ and $Q_{2}^{F}$ , respectively. Note that the size
of the capacities is assumed to be proportional to the scale of R&D investment because it is
reasonable to suppose that the higher the quality of R&D investment is, the larger capacities
the rm would like to have. In the example of a smartphone industry, the follower invests not
only in the facilities to produce the components of an existing smartphone but also in those
to develop and manufacture a ngerprint reader or a curved display, which correspond to $Q_{1}^{F}$
and $Q_{2}^{F}$ , respectively. The former can be invested at a lower cost, $\gamma c_{1}$ per unit with a constant
$\gamma\in[0$ , 1$]$ , because the patent has been granted to the leader in exchange for detailed public
disclosure of the invention, which enables the follower to imitate easily. Yet, the improvement in
technology can only be made at relatively higher costs, and we suppose that a unit of $Q_{2}^{F}$ costs
$c_{2}.$
Given the investments in the technologies with dierent level of novelty, the follower's revenue
consists of two channels; $P_{1}(t)Q_{1}^{F}+P_{2}(t)Q_{2}^{F}$ with
$P_{2}(t)=X(t)(1-\eta_{2}Q_{2}(t))$ (2.3)
where $Q_{2}(t)$ and a constant $\eta_{2}>0$ are dened in the same manner as (2.2). The investment
regarding the existing technology makes duopoly prot $P_{1}(t)Q_{1}^{F}$ since he competes with the
leader in terms of the total output $(i.e., Q_{1}(t)=Q_{1}^{L}+Q_{1}^{F})$ . Yet, the investment regarding the
second-generation technology of which novelty can only be found in the follower's product yields
monopoly revenue $P_{2}(t)Q_{2}^{F}.$
Having his product partially substituted by that of the follower, the leader can accuse the
follower of infringement, which costs both parties $C_{L}$ , to recover monopoly prot. Yet, the paten-
tee does not always win the trial. The patent occasionally turns out to be invalid at the court,
even though it has been granted by the authorities after appropriate examination. Innovation
is inherently cumulative, and thus the court takes into account how much the follower's tech-
nology overlaps with the leader's and how much improvement has been made in the subsequent
innovation when judging whether the follower has infringed on the precursor's patent rights.4
4Chang (1995) addressed that courts sometimes refuse to nd infringement if the allegedly infringing device
features major improvements. Green and Scotchmer (1995) and Llobet (2003) supposed that the amount of
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Yet, there is a room for discretion by the court in the sense that there can be a huge dierence
regarding the interpretation of patent breadth depending on patent policy. With this in mind,
we suppose that the patent is found to be valid at the court with probability $p$ given by
$p(Q_{1}^{F}, Q_{2}^{F}, d)= \exp(-\frac{Q_{2}^{F}}{Q_{1}^{F}}d)$ (2.4)
where a constant $d\in(0, \infty)$ denotes the extent to which the \Doctrine of Equivalents" is
applied.5 If the court rules that the follower has infringed on the leader's patent, which occurs
with probability $p$ , the follower is forced to cease production thenceforth, while the leader recovers
monopoly prots. With probability $1-p$ , however, the patent turns out to be invalid, the follow-
on research is acknowledged as legitimate innovation, and the follower maintains his position in
the market. Note that $\partial p(Q_{1}^{F}, Q_{2}^{F}, d)/\partial Q_{1}^{F}>0$ and $\partial p(Q_{1}^{F}, Q_{2}^{F}, d)/\partial Q_{2}^{F}<0$ hold; the former
implies that the more the follower's investment overlaps the leader's one, the more it is likely
to be found as infringement, while the latter suggests that the more improvement the follow-on
research has made, the more it is likely to be admitted as legitimate innovation. Regarding the
court's discretion, $\partial p(Q_{1}^{F}, Q_{2}^{F}, d)/\partial d<0$ holds, which claries the interpretation of $d$ ; the lower $d$
is, the wider the patent breadth is. Yet, $\lim_{Q_{2}^{F}arrow 0}p(Q_{1}^{F}, Q_{2}^{F}, d)=1$ and $\lim_{Q_{1}^{F}arrow 0}p(Q_{1}^{F}, Q_{2}^{F}, d)=0$
ensure that the discretion is excluded in the extreme cases.
The litigation process is costly for the patentee in many ways; not only is the legal cost $C_{L}$
a burden but also he gains nothing with probability $1-p$ in spite of the litigation expenses.
Thus, the leader can consider cross licensing as an alternative of a lawsuit. Namely, the leader,
still behind in technology, can make an oer that allows both parties to utilize each other's
work without fear of infringement. If agreed upon, the leader invests with his rst-best capacity
$Q_{2}^{L}$ to embrace the new technology in manufacturing his product, which incurs cost of $\gamma c_{2}$ per
unit, and this yields additional duopoly revenue of $P_{2}(t)Q_{2}^{L}$ . The oer, however, can be rejected
by the follower if it is better for him to be sued from the perspective of the expected prots.
This is because not only does his revenue decrease due to the competition regarding the second-
generation technology $(i.e., Q_{2}(t)=Q_{2}^{L}+Q_{2}^{F})$ but also there is a chance that he is found not
guilty at the court, which makes him continue to compete with the leader regarding the rst-
generation technology while raising monopoly revenue from the second-generation technology.
If this is the case, the leader can make an oer with the second-best capacity $Q_{2}^{L}$ which makes
the follower indierent between cross licensing and litigation, as $1$oIlg as the leader is better o
than involved in a lawsuit in terms of expected prots.
2.2 The benchmark model
In this subsection, we suppose that litigation is the only way for the leader to recover his prots
so as to facilitate the understanding of the framework. As usual, value functions of both parties
improvement determines the patent's validity, and Koo and Wright (2010) assumed that an invention based on
infringing research can be patented.
5Aoki and Hu (1999) noted that exactly what constitutes \equivalent is left to thejury to decide, and presumed
that the probability that the patent is found to be valid by the court is solely determined by the extent of the
Doctrine of Equivalents. A more sophisticated assumption can be found in Llobet (2003), which further takes into
account how much improvement is made from the subsequent innovation.
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will be determined backwards. For now, we assume that each event occurs sequentially, leaving
the case in which some of them take place simulaneously to be illustrated later.
First, suppose that the follower has carried out the follow-on research based on the existing
technology to manufacture an advanced product that partially substitutes the leader's product.
As the market demand grows, the leader's losses of revenue from the competition with the
follower become severe, and we can easily guess that there is an upper threshold, denoted by $x_{L},$
which triggers the leader's litigation against infringement with legal costs of $c_{L}$ for both parties.
If $x_{L}$ is hit, the court judges with probability $p$ that the follow-on research has infringed upon
the predecessor's work and forces the follower to cease production. Yet, the patent is found to
be invalid with probability $1-p$ , and the follower keeps his position in the market. Thus, the
leader's expected prot at time $t$ , provided that $x_{L}$ is hit, can be expressed as follows:
$\mathbb{E}[\int_{t}^{\infty}e^{-r(s-t)}\{p(Q_{1}^{L}X(s)(1-\eta_{1}Q_{1}^{L}))+(1-p)(Q_{1}^{L}X(s)\{1-\eta_{1}(Q_{1}^{L}+Q_{1}^{F}$ $\}ds|X(t)=x]$
$=p \frac{Q_{1}^{L}x(1-\eta_{1}Q_{1}^{L})}{r-\mu}+(1-p)\frac{Q_{1}^{L}x\{1-\eta_{1}(Q_{1}^{L}+Q_{1}^{F})\}}{r-\mu}$ . (2.5)
Meanwhile, by the standard argument, the option value of the rm, $v(x)$ , satises the fol-
lowing ordinary dierential equation:
$rv= \mu x\frac{\partial v}{\partial x}+\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}x^{2}\frac{\partial^{2}v}{\partial x^{2}}$ (2.6)
of which the solution takes the form as follows:
$v(x)=Ax^{\alpha}+Bx^{\beta}$ (2.7)
where
$\alpha=\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\mu}{\sigma^{2}}+\sqrt{(\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\mu}{\sigma^{2}})^{2}+\frac{2r}{\sigma^{2}}}>1,$ $\beta=\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\mu}{\sigma^{2}}-\sqrt{(\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\mu}{\sigma^{2}})^{2}+\frac{2r}{\sigma^{2}}}<0$ . (2.8)
With these in mind, we can delineate value function of the leader, having an option to litigate
over infringement. Given the demand shock $x$ and both parties' investment capacities $Q_{1}^{L}$ and
$Q_{1}^{F}$ , it can be written as follows:
$V_{L}^{L}(x, Q_{1}^{L}, Q_{1}^{F})=\{\begin{array}{ll}\frac{Q^{L}x\{1-\eta_{1}(Q^{L}+Q_{1}^{F})\}}{r-\mu}+A_{L}^{L}x^{\alpha}, x<x_{L},p\frac{Q_{1}^{L}x(1-\eta_{1}Q_{1}^{L})}{r-\mu}+(1-p)\frac{Q_{1}^{L}x\{1-\eta_{1}(Q_{1}^{L}+Q_{1}^{F})\}}{r-\mu}-c_{L}, x\geq x_{L}.\end{array}$ (2.9)
The litigation trigger $x_{L}$ and the coecient of option value $A_{L}^{L}$ are determined by value-matching
and smooth-pasting conditions as follows:
$x_{L}(Q_{1}^{L}, Q_{1}^{F})= \frac{-\mu)c_{L}}{(\alpha p\eta_{1}Q_{1}^{L}Q_{1}^{F}}$ , $A_{L}^{L}(Q_{1}^{L}, Q_{1}^{F})=( \frac{p\eta_{1}Q_{1}^{L}Q_{1}^{F}x_{L}}{r-\mu}-c_{L})x_{L^{-\alpha}}$ . (2.10)
Note that $\partial x_{L}(Q_{1}^{L}, Q_{1}^{F})/\partial Q_{1}^{F}<0$ and $\partial x_{L}(Q_{1}^{L}, Q_{1}^{F})/\partial Q_{1}^{L}<0$ hold. The former shows that the
more the follow-on research overlaps the patented technology, the more it is likely to provoke
a lawsuit, while the latter implies that the more the leader has devoted his resources to the
innovation, the more he is likely to accuse the follower of infringement.
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Having the litigation trigger determined by the leader, we can describe value function of the
follower confronted with an upcoming legal dispute. Given the demand shock $x$ and investment
capacities $Q_{1}^{L},$ $Q_{1}^{F}$ and $Q_{2}^{F}$ , it can be obtained in the same manner as follows:
$V_{F}^{L}(x, Q_{1}^{L}, Q_{1}^{F}, Q_{2}^{F})=\{\begin{array}{ll}\frac{Q_{1}^{F}x\{1-\eta_{1}(Q_{1}^{L}+Q_{1}^{F})\}+Q_{2}^{F}x(1-\eta_{2}Q_{2}^{F})}{r-\mu}+A_{F}^{L}x^{\alpha}, x<x_{L},(1-p)\frac{Q_{1}^{F}x\{1-\eta_{1}(Q_{1}^{L}+Q^{F})\}+Q^{F}x(1-\eta_{2}Q^{F})}{r-\mu}-c_{L}, x\geq x_{L}.\end{array}$ (2.11)
The coecient of option value $A_{F}^{L}$ is determined by value matching condition as follows:
$A_{F}^{L}(Q_{1}^{L}, Q_{1}^{F}, Q_{2}^{F})=[-p \frac{Q_{1}^{F}x_{L}\{1-\eta_{1}(Q_{1}^{L}+Q_{1}^{F})\}+Q_{2}^{F}x_{L}(1-\eta_{2}Q_{2}^{F})}{r-\mu}-c_{L}]x_{L}^{-\alpha}$ . (2.12)
Now, we proceed to the follower's decision to carry out the follow-on research and to man-
ufacture advanced products based on it. We can easily guess that there is an upper threshold,
denoted by $x_{I}$ , which triggers the follow-on research (or (alleged infringement provided that
the basic technology has been developed by the predecessor. Innovation is inherently cumulative,
and thus the outcome of the follower's research and development can partially substitute the
leader's product. The investment capacity regarding the rst-generation technology, denoted by
$Q_{1}^{F}$ , costs $\gamma c_{1}$ per unit, and it yields duopoly revenue. Yet, the second-generation technology can
only be found in the follower's product, and thus he can raise monopoly prot from the invest-
ment in $Q_{2}^{F}$ which incurs $c_{2}$ per unit. Note that the follower takes into account the forthcoming
legal dispute that depends on the ratio of the capacities of his investment. Thus, the follower's
value function at the moment of investment given the demand shock $x$ is as follows:
$\frac{Q_{1}^{F}x\{1-\eta_{1}(Q_{1}^{L}+Q_{1}^{F})\}+Q_{2}^{F}x(1-\eta_{2}Q_{2}^{F})}{r-\mu}+A_{F}^{L}x^{\alpha}-\gamma c_{1}Q_{1}^{F}-c_{2}Q_{2}^{F}$ (2.13)
where $A_{F}^{L}$ is given by (2.12). Maximizing (2.13) with respect to $Q_{1}^{F}$ and $Q_{2}^{F}$ yields the optimal
capacities $Q_{1}^{F^{*}}(x, Q_{1}^{L}, Q_{2}^{F})$ and $Q_{2}^{F^{*}}(x, Q_{1}^{L}, Q_{1}^{F})$ , respectively. Following the similar argument,
value function of the follower given the demand shock $x$ and the leader's investment capacity
$Q_{1}^{L}$ can be described as follows:
$V_{F}^{I}(x, Q_{1}^{L})=\{\begin{array}{ll}A_{F}^{I}x^{\alpha}, x<x_{I},V_{F}^{L}(x, Q_{1}^{L}, Q_{1}^{F^{*}}, Q_{2}^{F^{*}})-\gamma c_{1}Q_{1}^{F^{*}}-c_{2}Q_{2}^{F^{*}}, x\geq x_{I}.\end{array}$ (2.14)
The trigger of \alleged infringement" $x_{I}$ and the coecient of option value $A_{F}^{I}$ are determined
by value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions at the trigger as follows:
$x_{I}(Q_{1}^{L})= \frac{\alpha(r-\mu)(\gamma c_{1}Q_{1}^{F^{*}}+c_{2}Q_{2}^{F^{*}})}{(\alpha-1)[Q_{1}^{F^{*}}\{1-\eta_{1}(Q_{1}^{L}+Q_{1}^{F^{*}})\}+Q_{2}^{F^{*}}(1-\eta_{2}Q_{2}^{F^{*}})]}$ , (2.15)
$A_{F}^{I}(Q_{1}^{L})=[ \frac{Q_{1}^{F^{*}}x_{I}\{1-\eta_{1}(Q_{1}^{L}+Q_{1}^{F^{*}})\}+Q_{2}^{F^{*}}x_{I}(1-\eta_{2}Q_{2}^{F^{*}})}{r-\mu}+A_{F}^{L}(Q_{1}^{L},Q_{1}^{F^{*}})x_{I}^{\alpha}-\gamma c_{1}Q_{1}^{F^{*}}-c_{2}Q_{2}^{F^{*}}]x_{I}^{-\alpha}.$
(2.16)
Having the trigger determined by the follower, now we can calculate value function of the
leader of which product can be partially substituted in the same manner as follows:
$V_{L}^{I}(x, Q_{1}^{L})=\{\begin{array}{ll}\frac{Q_{1}^{L}x(1Q_{1}^{L})}{r}+A_{L}^{I}x^{\alpha}, x<x_{I)}V_{L}^{L}(x, Q_{1}^{L}, Q_{1}^{F^{*}}) , x\geq x_{I}.\end{array}$ (2.17)
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The coecient of option value $A_{L}^{I}$ is determined by value-matching condition at the trigger as
follows:
$A_{L}^{I}(Q_{1}^{L})=A_{L}^{L}(Q_{1}^{L}, Q_{1}^{F^{*}})- \frac{\eta_{1}Q_{1}^{L}Q_{1}^{F^{*}}x_{I}^{1-\alpha}}{r-\mu}$ . (2.18)
Lastly, we proceed to the leader's value function at the initial stage. We can also easily
guess that there is an upper threshold, denoted by $x_{P}$ , which triggers the leader's innovation
and patent acquisition. The investment capacity $Q_{1}^{L}$ cost $c_{1}$ per unit, and the leader makes
monopoly prot from it until the follower challenges it by making a product that can partially
substitute his product. The leader takes into account the upcoming challenge by the follower,
and thus his value function at the moment of investment given the demand shock $x$ is as follows:
$\frac{Q_{1}^{L}x(1-\eta_{1}Q_{1}^{L})}{r-\mu}+A_{L}^{I}x^{\alpha}-c_{1}Q_{1}^{L}$ (2.19)
where $A_{L}^{I}$ is given by (2.18). The optimal investment capacity $Q_{1}^{L^{*}}(x)$ can be obtained by
maximizing (2.19) with respect to $Q_{1}^{L}$ . Following the same argument, we can describe the leader's
value function at the initial stage as follows:
$V_{L}^{P}(x)=\{\begin{array}{ll}A_{P}x^{\alpha}, x<x_{P},V_{L}^{I}(x, Q_{1}^{L^{*}})-c_{1}Q_{1}^{L^{*}} x\geq x_{P}.\end{array}$ (2.20)
The trigger of patent acquisition $x_{P}$ and the coecient of option value $A_{P}$ are determined by
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions at the trigger as follows:
$x_{P}= \frac{\alpha(r-\mu)c_{1}Q_{1}^{L^{*}}}{(\alpha-1)Q_{1}^{L^{*}}(1-\eta_{1}Q_{1}^{L^{*}})},$ $A_{P}=[ \frac{Q_{1}^{L^{*}}x_{P}(1-\eta_{1}Q_{1}^{L^{*}})}{r-\mu}+A_{L}^{I}(Q_{1}^{L^{*}})x_{P}^{\alpha}-c_{1}Q_{1}^{L^{*}}]x_{P}^{-\alpha}.$ $(2.21)$
So far, we have implicity assumed that the following inequality holds regarding the triggers:
$x_{P}<x_{I}<x_{L}$ . (2.22)
This has enabled us to focus on the case in which the events occur sequentially. However, the
follower can delay his investment so that
$x_{P}, x_{L}<x_{I}$ . (2.23)
holds. Furthermore, the leader can also delay the initial investment so that
$x_{I}<x_{P}<x_{L}$ . (2.24)
or
$x_{I}, x_{L}<x_{P}$ . (2.25)
holds. The explanation on these cases is omitted here, and can be found in Jeon (2015).
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2.3 The main model
Having outlined the framework, now we proceed to the main model in which the leader can make
an oer of cross licensing. If agreed upon, the leader makes an investment with capacity $Q_{2}^{L}$ to
take advantage of the second-generation technology developed by the follower, and it incurs a
cost of $\gamma c_{2}$ per unit. The oer, however, can be rejected by the follower, and furthermore it
might not even be oered from the very beginning for the sake of the leader's interests. Namely,
the leader might choose a lawsuit over an agreement of cross licensing if he is better o in terms
of expected prots, even though the follower is willing to accept the oer. For now, we suppose
that the leader makes an oer and it is accepted by the follower and that the events occur
sequentially, leaving the whole picture to be described later.
First, suppose that the subsequent innovation has been made by the follower and the leader's
product has been partially substituted by that of the follower. Then, the leader can make an oer
of cross licensing in order to raise extra revenue from the second-generation technology developed
by the follower. We can guess that there is an upper threshold, denoted by $x_{C}$ , which triggers
cross licensing, and having $x_{C}$ hit, the leader's value function at the moment of investment given
the demand shock $x$ is as follows:
$\frac{Q_{1}^{L}x\{1-\eta_{1}(Q_{1}^{L}+Q_{1}^{F})\}+Q_{2}^{L}x\{1-\eta_{2}(Q_{2}^{L}+Q_{2}^{F})\}}{r-\mu}-\gamma c_{2}Q_{2}^{L}$ . (2.26)
Maximizing (2.26) with respect to $Q_{2}^{L}$ yields the leader's optimal capacity regarding the second-
generation technology $Q_{2}^{L^{*}}(x, Q_{2}^{F})$ , and the leader's value function at this stage can be written
as follows:
$V_{L}^{C}(x, Q_{1}^{L}, Q_{1}^{F}, Q_{2}^{F})=\{\begin{array}{ll}\frac{Q_{1}^{L}x\{1-\eta_{1}(Q_{1}^{L}+Q_{1}^{F})\}}{r-\mu}+A_{L}^{C}x^{\alpha}, x<xc,\frac{Q_{1}^{L}x\{1-\eta_{1}(Q_{1}^{L}+Q_{1}^{F})\}+Q_{2}^{L^{*}}x\{1-\eta_{2}(Q_{2}^{L^{*}}+Q_{2}^{F})\}}{r-\mu}-\gamma c_{2}Q_{2}^{L^{*}} x\geq x_{C},\end{array}$ (2.27)
where smooth-t condition at the trigger determines the following:
$x_{C}(Q_{2}^{F})= \frac{\alpha(r-\mu)\gamma c_{2}}{(\alpha-1)\{1-\eta_{2}(Q_{2}^{L^{*}}+Q_{2}^{F})\}},$ $A_{L}^{C}(Q_{2}^{F})=[ \frac{Q_{2}^{L^{*}}x_{C}\{1-\eta_{2}(Q_{2}^{L^{*}}+Q_{2}^{F})\}}{r-\mu}-\gamma c_{2}Q_{2}^{L^{*}}]x_{C}^{-\alpha}.$
(2.28)
Having the trigger of cross licensing determined by the leader, we can delineate value function
of the follower of which novel technology can be utilized by his competitor. If agreed upon, he
competes with the leader with regard to not only the rst-generation technology but also the
second generation technology from which he has raised monopoly prots, and thus the follower's
value function can be written as follows:
$V_{F}^{C}(x, Q_{1}^{L}, Q_{1}^{F}, Q_{2}^{F})=\{\begin{array}{ll}\frac{Q_{1}^{F}x\{1-\eta_{1}(Q_{1}^{L}+Q_{1}^{F})\}+Q^{F}x(1-\eta_{2}Q_{2}^{F})}{r-\mu}+A_{F}^{C}x^{\alpha}, x<x_{C},\frac{Q_{1}^{F}x\{1-\eta_{1}(Q_{\rceil}^{L}+Q_{1}^{F})\}+Q_{2}^{F}x\{1-\eta_{2}(Q_{2}^{L^{*}}+Q_{2}^{F})\}}{r-\mu}, x\geq x_{C},\end{array}$ (2.29)
where value-matching condition at the trigger yields the following:
$A_{F}^{C}(Q_{2}^{F})=- \frac{\eta_{2}Q_{2}^{L^{*}}Q_{2}^{F}x_{C}^{1-\alpha}}{r-\mu}$ . (2.30)
The rest of the steps follow the same argument as the benchmark model: deriving value
functions of the two rms backwards for the follow-on and the initial investments. We omit
them here for brevity and they can be found in the original paper of Jeon (2015).
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2.4 The whole picture
In the previous subsections, we illustrated a few possible scenarios from the present model sepa-
rately. In Section 2.2, we focused on the benchmark model in which litigation over infringement
is the only way for the leader to recover his prots, and in Section 2.3, we integrated the agree-
ment of cross licensing, which allows the stakeholders to utilize each other's technology without
fear of infringement. In particular, the latter has been discussed under the condition that the
follower accepts the oer, although the investment capacity of the leader might be either the
rst-best or the second-best, and this implicitly presumes that the leader makes an oer to the
follower.
In reality, however, this might not be the case. Namely, the leader might not oer the contract
of cross licensing and rather chooses to accuse the follower of infringement in spite of the legal
costs and the risks of losing the validity of his patent. To be more precise, the leader compares
his option value of litigation and that of cross licensing with the rst-best capacity, if possible,
or with the second-best capacity, and chooses the one that maximizes his expected prots.
Furthermore, not only the way the rms resolve the dispute but also the sequential/simultaneous
occurrence of each event is determined for the sake of the stakeholders' interests, provided that
they hold for given parameters.
3 Comparative statics and discussion
3.1 Parameters
We adopt the following parameters as the benchmark case:
$r=0.05$ ; $\mu=0.02$ ; $\sigma=0.2$ ; $\eta_{1}=0.4$ ; $\eta_{2}=0.6$ ;
$c_{1}=2$ ; $c_{2}=2$ ; $c_{L}=1$ ; $\gamma=0.7$ $d=0.5$ ; $x=0.1$ . (3.1)







(b) The investment capacities of the leader and
(a) The level of triggers for each event
the follower
Figure 1: The comparative statics regarding the expected growth rate of market demand
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Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the level of triggers with regard to the expected growth rate, which
naturally reveals the sequential/simultaneous occurrence of the events. First of all, we can see
that the leader and the follower agree on cross licensing when the expected growth rate of
market demand is very low. It is obvious that when the market is not protable enough, the
rms have less incentive to monopolize their technologies bearing the legal costs. Moreover, the
introduction of basic technology is so delayed that the follow-on research and cross licensing
are triggered simultaneously. That is, both parties start their business when the market is very
mature, and there is no dierence in the level of technology adopted in their products.
As the expected growth rate increases, however, they fail to reach an agreement on cross
licensing and resolve the dispute over infringement at the court. Intuitively, they desire to take
a larger share in the fast-growing market, which makes the agreement less likely to be reached.
Yet, the advent of basic technology is still deferred so that the follow-on research initiates as
soon as the leader carries out the initial innovation, while the lawsuit is brought later on, and
this corresponds to (2.24). Panel (b) of Figure 1 represents the optimal investment capacities
of both parties, and we can see that as the law steps in the resolution of conict, the follower
curtails his investment capacities in imitating the old technology signicantly and augments
those devoted to enhancing the technology. This is because the follower knows that unless he
does so, he is more likely to lose the case and to be driven out of the market. The implication
of this result becomes even clearer as the expected growth rate increases further.
If the expected growth rate of market demand is very high and the investment is lucrative
enough to reward the anticipated losses of prots from the competition with the follower, the
leader does not delay his investment in innovation and patent acquisition. That is, (2.22) holds
when $\mu$ is very high. Furthermore, Panel (b) shows that as the expected growth rate increases
further, the follower devotes more investment capacity to yield improvement in technology rather
than (invent around" the existing one, and there are two reasons for this result. First, for given
$p$ , the leader is more willing to accuse the follower of infringement as the market becomes more
protable, and thus the follower focuses on developing his own technology so as not to provoke
a lawsuit that can possibly lead to a ban on his production. Recall that $p$ is endogenously
determined by (2.4), and that it decreases as more capacity of the subsequent investment is
devoted to yield improvement in technology. Second, if the market is lucrative enough, the
follower has stronger incentive to develop the technology of which novelty can only be found
in his product in order to raise monopoly revenue from it, rather than sharing prots from the
old-fashioned technology with precursor.
We can also comprehend these results from the perspective of dierentiated goods. If the
expected growth rate of market demand is so high that the competition between the rms ends
with a legal dispute, there is a distinct dierence between the products manufactured by the
leader and the follower unless the follower is found guilty at the court and driven out of the
market. The product of the leader, who has established the foundation from which progress
can be 1mde, is behind the technology, and the follower's product is advanced in terms of the
novelty of technology adopted in it unless the subsequent innovation loses its legitimacy by the
ruling. Meanwhile, if the market demand is expected to grow very slowly, the advent of the
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rst-generation technology is so delayed that the follow-on research and the reconciliation via
cross licensing are triggered at the same time. This implies that the features of the products
in the market converge upon each other, leaving little dierence between them from the very
beginning. This is consistent with what we can observe in the real world. There are a number
of dierentiated goods in the burgeoning market, while the products become similar with each
other when the market loses its momentum in its growth.
To facilitate better understanding, let us take an example of the market of smartphones again.
A few years ago, the market started growing rapidly, and the giant IT rms such as Apple and
Samsung manufactured their smartphones with distinctly dierent features. Furthermore, they
used to accuse each other of infringement, even regarding the design of software, leading to
a year-long patent war. As the growth of the market becomes slower, however, they chose to
settle the ongoing lawsuits and began taking advantage of the features of each other's products,
ooding the market with similar products in terms of size, design, hardward, and even software
embedded in them. We can observe the similar tendency in the market of tablet PCs, where
demand has grown rapidly in the wake of smartphones. From these observations, we can easily
expect that the same sequence of events will occur in the market of smart wearables in which
the demand is about to explode in the very near future.
The present model eectively integrates price-elasticity into the timing of investment, its
capacity, and the resolution of conict. Thus, it is worth investigating the comparative statics






(b) The investment capacities of the leader and
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Figure 2: The comparative statics regarding the price elasticity of the rst-generation technology
Figure 2 presents the comparative statics with regard to $\eta_{1}$ , the price elasticity of the rst-
generation technology developed by the leader. Panel (a) shows that when the demand on the
rst-generation technology is very inelastic, they fail to reach an agreement of cross licensing.
Intuitively, when customers are willing to pay a high price regarding the rst-generation tech-
nology, the leader has strong bargaining power in the negotiation, and thus claims a large share
in the market of the second-generation technology, which makes the agreement of cross licensing
less likely to be reached. As it becomes more price-elastic, the follower reduces his resources de-
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voted to imitate the rst-generation technology from which less revenue is expected to be made,
and this leads to the downward slope of $Q_{1}^{F}$ (Panels (b) ). Note that the competition with the
follower in the market makes the leader defer his investment until the market becomes mature.
After $\eta_{1}$ exceeds a certain level, however, the rms succeed in resolving the problem without
a legal dispute because the leader requires less share in the market of the second-generation
technology. The follow-on research is delayed signicantly so that the cross licensing is triggered
simultaneously, while the initial innovation is made individually. Furthermore, as we can see from
Panel (b), the follower curtails his investment devoted to enhancing the technology signicantly
and rather chooses to invent around the old technology at a lower cost because he is no longer
afraid of a lawsuit over infringement.
If the price elasticity regarding the rst-generation technology increases further, the follower
reduces the capacity of the rst-generation technology and raises that of the second-generation
technology. This is a natural result because the investment in the rst-generation technology
becomes less attractive, yielding less prots and raising the possibility of being driven out of
the market. In contrast, the leader reduces the investment capacities in both technologies. The
decrease of investment in the rst-generation technology is obvious, and that in the second-
generation technology results from the fact that the leader has less bargaining power in the
negotiation of cross licensing as the investment in the basic technology becomes less attractive.
In this subsection, we have examined the impact of market demand on the way the stakehold-
ers resolve the conict from various perspectives; its expected growth rate and the consumer's
willingness to pay a high price. The bottom line was that the more lucrative the market is, the
more the competitors are likely to go to court, and this nding is consistent with the argument
of a number of previous studies. For instance, Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) delineated key de-
terminants of legal disputes among the rms and argued that the probability of litigation rises
in the size of the stakes. Lemley and Shapiro (2005) also noted that the patents involved in
a lawsuit are those that are commercially important enough to endure the costs of litigation.
Empirical studies carried out by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) showed that more \valuable"
patents tend to involve alawsuit with much higher probability, and Somaya (2003) also provided
empirical evidence showing that the lawsuits are less likely to be settled if the stakeholders have
large stakes in the litigated patent.
3.3 Patent system and welfare analysis
One of the most signicant features of the present model is that it endogenously determines how
much the subsequent innovation overlaps with the existing technology and how much improve-
ment is made from it. This feature draws on the assumption that the probability of the existing
patent found to be valid by the court depends on the degree of overlapping and improvement,
and thus the follower takes this into account in deciding how his resources will be allocated
in the follow-on research in order to maximize his expected prots. Yet, there is still a room
for discretion by the court represented by $d$ , except for the extreme cases in which there is no
imitation or no novelty $(i.e., Q_{1}^{F}=0 or Q_{2}^{F}=0)$ , and it can be read as the authorities' patent




(b) The investment capacities of the leader and
(a) The level of triggers for each event
the follower
(c) The probability that the patent is found to (d) Total expected surplus of each agent and
be valid at the court social welfare
Figure 3: The comparative statics regarding the extent to which the patent scope is interpreted
for the base case
the policy on patent rights aects the rms' investment timing, their capacities, the way they
resolve the conict, and thus the level of social welfare. Figure 3 represents the comparative
statics with regard to $d.$
We can see from Panel (a) that when the scope of patent is interpreted in a very narrow
sense so that its validity is acknowledged in a very limited case $(i.e.,$ when $d is$ very high) ,
the stakeholders resolve the conict via cross licensing. This is a natural result because the
leader is less likely to win the case over infringement, and thus he rather opts for cross licensing
to raise extra revenues, even with a small market share as described in Panel (b). This can
be read in the context of Aoki and Hu (1999), which showed that a patentee may decide to
license the technology to prevent imitation if the legal costs and probability of winning make
the patentee unable to credibly threaten the challenger with a lawsuit. Note that given the
leader's willingness to take advantage of the second-generation technology, the follower delays his
investment signicantly until the market grows enough to reward the losses of revenue from the
competition, and thus the follow-on research and the agreement of cross licensing are triggered
at the same time.
As the breadth of patent becomes wider $(i.e., as d$ decreases) , the leader holds a more
54
dominant position in the negotiation of cross licensing, and this is represented by the increase of
$Q_{2}^{L}$ and the decrease of $Q_{2}^{F}$ in Panel (b). When $d$ decreases further and falls below a certain level,
the leader chooses to accuse the follower, encouraged by the judge's hard line against patent
infringement. Panel (c) shows that as $d$ decreases, the probability that the patentee wins the
case increases for a while, which is a natural result. When $d$ gets much lower, however, $p$ has
a tendency to decrease because the follower reduces $Q_{1}^{F}$ at a more rapid rate than $Q_{2}^{F}$ . That
is, when the patent protection is so strong that alledged infringement is found guilty even with
little imitation of the patented technology, the follower devotes most of his resources to develop
his own technology. This leads to the increase of litigation trigger described in Panel (a).
Furthermore, Panel (a) shows that if the patent scope is wide enough $(i.e., d is low$ enough)
to induce the leader to choose a lawsuit over cross licensing, the advent of the basic technology
is so delayed that it triggers the subsequent innovation at the same time because of the expected
losses of revenue from the follower's challenge, while the legal dispute is triggered separately.
This is in sharp constrast with the case in which both parties agree on the cross licensing due
to the weak protection of patent rights $(i.e.,$ high value $of d)$ . Recall that, in that case, it is the
follow-on research that is delayed signicantly so that both parties begin to take advantage of
the advanced technology at the same time, while the initial innovation is carried out without
triggering any other events. This can be read in the view of the erosion of monopoly prots
and the rms' response to it. In the former case, it is the leader of which monopoly revenue is
threatened by the competitor's challenge, and thus the leader delays his investment until the
demand grows enough. In the latter case, however, now it is the follower of which monopoly
prot from his own technology is expected to be eroded by the competitor, and thus the follower
defers the subsequent innovation until the market becomes mature. This result has signicant
implication from the perspective of public policy and social welfare. It implies that the policy
on patent scope cannot yield the rst-best result in terms of the pace of technological progress.
This is in line with Scotchmer (1991) and Green and Scotchmer (1995), who have shown that,
under appropriate assumptions, it is impossible for both the initial innovator and the follow-on
innovator to have adequate incentives under a patent system.
The timing of the advent of technologies, however, is not the only determinant in the esti-
mation of social welfare. That is, we need to take into account other aspects of the change in
the market as well in order to evaluate social welfare in a more accurate way. After a tedious
algebra, we can evaluate consumer surplus, producer surplus, and social welfare. We omit them
here, and they can be found in the original paper of Jeon (2015).
Panel (d) of Figure 3 depicts welfare analysis regarding the patent policy represented by
$d$ . By comparing with Panel (a), we can easily see that consumer surplus and social welfare
are much higher when the dispute is resolved via cross licensing, and this is because it does
not involve legal costs and there are many more products with novel technology at much lower
prices. This nding is in line with Shapiro (2001), who argued that a royalty-free cross license
is the rst-best result from the perspective of competition and that any cross license is supe-
rior to a world in which the stakeholders fail to cooperate. U.S. Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission (1995) also shed light on the procompetitive features of cross licens-
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ing, noting that it helps the rms to integrate complementary technologies by clearing blocking
positions and to ease the burden of transaction costs and legal expenses. Denicol\`o (2002) ad-
dressed that collusion between successive patentees through cross-licensing agreements might be
socially benecial under circumstances much less limited than in Chang (1995), which provided
only limited support for the permission on collusion, even if the patents are competing rather
than complementary or blocking.
Given these results, one might conclude that the narrower the patent scope is, the more
social welfare we can yield. Yet, we can see from Panel (d) that after $d$ exceeds a certain
level at which the rms agree on cross licensing, consumer surplus and social welfare gradually
decrease as $d$ increases further, that is, as the scope of patent becomes even narrower. At a
glance, this might seem unnatural because they do not go to the court in which $d$ directly
matters. However, $d$ still comes into play if the agreement of cross licensing is made based on
the leader's second-best capacity, which makes the follower indierent between litigation and
cross licensing. Namely, when $d$ is relatively low yet still in the range that ensures the agreement
of cross licensing, the patent is interpreted in a relatively wide sense and the leader has more
bargaining power in the negotiation, which enables him to raise investment capacity regarding
the second-generation technology. We can observe from Panel (b) that as $d$ increases further,
$Q_{2}^{L}$ decreases at a more rapid rate than the increase of $Q_{2}^{F}$ , and this is because the follower has
an incentive to manufacture fewer products to keep the price as high as possible. If $d$ is very
high and the patent can maintain its validity only in a very limited case, however, the follower,
who is aware of this, requires more rewards to accept the oer of cross licensing, which leads
to less products with the advanced technology at a higher price. Thus, we can claim that the
authorities' stance against infringement still matters even if the dispute is resolved out of court
and that the narrow interpretation of patent rights to induce the agreement of cross licensing
does not always guarantee the improvement of social welfare.
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